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WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
By focusing upon remedies and public policy to construe the Minne-
sota Franchise Act and apply it to the facts of Clust'au, the court has pro-
vided adequate relief without unduly controlling commercial law. It has
refined the public policy scope of the Minnesota Franchise Act without
limiting it to a tortured construction of the UCC.43 As long as the deal-
ership agreement between the contracting parties can be shown to fit
within the definitional parameters of a franchise,44 the policy behind the
Minnesota Franchise Act covers every part of the agreement and those
responsibilities and duties integral or ancillary to it.4 5
Notwithstanding other decisions to the contrary,46 the holding in Clu-
s'au4 7 reflects the trend of limiting assignee rights,48 and increasing judi-
cial skepticism of the validity of waiver of defense clauses.49 The decision
is also in accord with the basic legislative intent to protect the franchisee
in situations of unequal bargaining power. 50
Hearsay Evidence-ADMISSIBILITY AT CRIMINAL TRIALS OF EX PARTE
STATEMENTS WHERE DECLARANT IS UNAVAILABLE-Iate v. Hansen, 312
N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1980).
Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible in court.2 To be admissi-
ble at trial, testimony usually must meet three requirements: the declar-
ant must be under oath, 3 the declarant must be present at trial,4 and the
43. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. The UCC supplements local rules with-
out necessarily replacing them. Chase Manhattan did not qualify itself as a holder in due
course by a formal application of the definitional criteria.
44. See MINN. STAT. § 80C.01, subd. 4 (1982).
45. See generally H. BROWN, supra note 25, at 32-51.
46. See cases cited supra note 26.
47. 308 N.W.2d at 490.
48. Comment, Sales: Minnesota Statute Regulates Consumer Notes and Limits Rights of As-
signee-Minn. Stat. § 325.940-.941 (/971), 56 MINN. L. REv. 510 (1972).
49. Comment, Uniform Commercial Code-Assignments-Condtional Sales Contracts-
Waiver of Defense Clauses, 58 Ky. L.J. 850, 856-57 (1970). For a contrary argument, see
Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74 YALE L.J. 217, 231-33
(1964).
50. Note, supra note 3.
1. Hearsay is defined in MINN. R. EvID. 801(c) as "[a] statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted." See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1978).
2. For an indepth analysis of the hearsay rule, see 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 1364 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
3. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 245, at 582.
The oath may be important in two aspects. As a ceremonial and religious sym-
bol it may induce in the witness a feeling of special obligation to speak the truth,
and also it may impress upon the witness the danger of criminal punishment for
perjury, to which the judicial oath or equivalent solemn affirmation would be a
prerequisite condition.
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declarant must be available for cross-examination.5 These requirements
are designed to ensure that truthful and trustworthy testimony is ob-
tained. 6 If any of the three requirements are not met, the rule against
hearsay usually makes the testimony inadmissible. 7 Hearsay, however,
may be admissible if it falls within one of a limited number of exceptions
to the hearsay rule.8 The exceptions cover circumstances where there is
sufficient reason to believe that the statement is true although the three
requirements are not met.9 Exceptions to the hearsay rule are divided
into two categories: t0 First, the admissibility of evidence not affected by
the availability of the declarant;1I second, admissibility of evidence
which requires that the declarant be unavailable.12
In State v. Hansen, 13 the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the un-
available declarant exception to the hearsay rule. The Hansen court held
that unsworn, out-of-court statements made by two declarants who re-
fused to testify at the defendant's criminal trial were not admissible as
exceptions to the hearsay rule14 under Minnesota Rules of Evidence
804(b)(3)15 and 804(b)(5).16 The court further held that admitting into
Id
4. This requirement gives the trier of fact an opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witness. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d at 103 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
242-43 (1895)); see Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
5. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 245, at 583. Wigmore states that cross-exami-
nation is the fundamental test of hearsay evidence. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1362.
6. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 245, at 581.
7. See id at 582.
8. See MINN. R. EvID. 803, 804.
9. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1422.
10. "The basis for the distinction is largely historical, and represents a judgment as to
which hearsay statements are so trustworthy as to be admissible without requiring the
production of the declarant when available." MINN. R. EvID. 803 comment.
11. See MINN. R. EvID. 803.
12. See MINN. R. EvID. 803 comment. Under MINN. R. EVID. 804(b)(l)-(5), the fol-
lowing are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
former testimony, statement under belief of impending death, statement against penal
interest, statement of personal or family history.
13. 312 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1981).
14. See id. at 98.
15. Rule 804(b)(3) provides for an exception to the hearsay rule for a statement
against interest, defined as:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declar-
ant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he
believed it to be true.
Id. For a general discussion on statements against interest, see Hack, Declarations Against
Interest- Standards ofAdmissbility under an Emerging Majority Rule, 56 B.U.L. REv. 148 (1976);
Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest.- An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARv. L. REV. I
(1944).
16. Rule 804(b)(5) provides in pertinent part:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but hay-
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evidence the statements of the two unavailable witnesses violated defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to confrontation.1 7 Because admitting the
ing equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, [is not excluded by
the hearsay rule] if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence.
Id. See generally 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1455.
17. 312 N.W.2d at 103. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right
• . . to be confronted by the witnesses against him .... ." U.S. CONST. amend VI. The
sixth amendment right of an accused to confront the witness against him applies to state
criminal prosecutions via the fourteenth amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
403-06 (1965).
In 1976, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in United States v. Carlson, 547
F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977), that a statement made to a
grand jury by a subsequently unavailable witness, could be admitted into evidence under
the rule 804(b)(5) exception to the hearsay rule. Id at 1354; see 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 804(b)(5)[0] (1981). The issue presented to the Carlson
court was whether the defendant waived his constitutional right to confrontation of the
accusing witness, when evidence shows that the defendant caused the absence of the wit-
ness by threats and intimidation. See 547 F.2d at 1359-60. The equitable principle which
underlies the Carlson decision is set forth in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159
(1878), where the Court stated "[t]hat no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his
own wrong." See also Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule. Sir Walter
Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 139 (1972).
The Carlson decision would not have been so dramatic had another court previously
dealt with the issue, see 547 F.2d at 1358, or if the court had stated an evidentiary stan-
dard necessary to create this waiver. 547 F.2d at 1357. An adequate standard would be
one indicating the level of evidence necessary prior to the decision to deny the accused of
his sixth amendment right. Whether this level should be a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence or something more, Carlson does not state.
For recent cases adopting the Carlson approach, see Tolbert v. Jago, 607 F.2d 753 (6th
Cir. 1979),cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1022 (1980); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir.
1978); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Garner, 574
F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d
1271 (5th Cir. 1977). Carlson was criticized in United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 627-
28 (5th Cir. 1982), where the court felt that once hearsay statements are found trustwor-
thy, there is no need to find a voluntary waiver of the defendant's confrontation rights.
The United States Supreme Court has had difficulty defining what is involved in the
constitutional right to confrontation. For a historical perspective of the court's problem,
see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The Pointer Court held that the right of con-
frontation as guaranteed to an accused by the sixth amendment is made obligatory on the
states through the fourteenth amendment. See 380 U.S. at 403. There is an historical
relationship between confrontation and the hearsay exceptions.
In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), although the witness, an accused ac-
complice, refused to testify on fifth amendment self-incrimination grounds, his out-of-
court confession implicating Douglas was read in the presence of the jury by the prosecu-
tor. The Douglas Court held that: "[ojur cases construing the [confrontation] clause hold
that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination." Id at 418. The
Douglas Court explained that physical confrontation need not be present if adequate op-
portunity for cross-examination is satisfied. Id But see, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970) (murder conviction based on an inculpatory statement made by a co-conspirator
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statements into evidence was not harmless error beyond a reasonable
doubt,i8 the defendant's conviction was reversed and a new trial was
granted. 19
In Hansen, the defendant, William T. Hansen, Sr., was charged with
three counts of aggravated criminal damage to property.20 It was al-
leged that Hansen and others were involved in a shooting incident on a
powerline construction site in Polk County on March 14, 1978.21 Two
weeks later, in response to the United Power Association's announcement
while in prison affirmed). The Dutton Court attempted to distinguish prior cases, Roberts
v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Brookhart v. Janis,
384 U.S. 1 (1966); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), which together seem to
require cross-examination in order to satisfy the right of confrontation. See Dutton, 400
U.S. at 83-87.
The dissent in Dutton argues that the majority decision is "[c]ompletely inconsistent
with recent opinions of this Court." Id. at 100. The dissent further stated that "absent the
opportunity for cross-examination, testimony about the incriminating and implicating
statement allegedly made by Williams [the co-conspirator] was constitutionally inadmissi-
ble in the trial." Id at 103.
In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970), a majority of the Court rejected the
view of the California Supreme Court that "belated cross-examination can never serve as
a constitutionally adequate substitute" for contemporaneous cross-examination. The
Green Court held that the admission of prior inconsistent statements was not in itself a
violation of the right of confrontation "as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness
and subject to full and effective cross-examination." Id at 158.
The results of these cases have left the lower courts in a quandary since the Supreme
Court seems to emphasize the importance of cross-examination yet, in Green, the Court
allows something less than full cross-examination. In the future a federal or state court's
determination of a particular case will be on an ad hoc basis. See Graham, The Right of
Confrontation and Rules of Evidence; Sir Walter Raleigh Rides Again, 9 A LAsKA L.J. 3 (1971);
Natali, Green, Dutton & Chambers: Three Cases in Search of a Theoy, 7 RUTG.-CAM. L.J.
REV. 43 (1975); Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay.- A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, 1
HOFSTRA L. REV. 32 (1973); see also United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978)
(construing Supreme Court decisions, allowed admission of hearsay where adequate relia-
bility was provided by means other than a prior opportunity for cross-examination). No-
tably, the Dutton opinion was questioned in United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309, 316 n.6
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977), and criticized in United States v. Oates, 560
F.2d 45, 83 (2d Cir. 1977).
18. Harmless errors are errors committed by the trial court which do not affect the
outcome of the case or affect any substantial rights of the defendant. "All 50 states have
harmless-error statutes or rules, and the United States long ago through its Congress estab-
lished for its courts the rule that judgments shall not be reversed for 'errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.' 28 U.S.C. § 211." Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
19. 312 N.W.2d at 105.
20. Id at 99.
21. Id. at 98. At approximately 11:58 p.m., a light-colored, four-wheel-drive vehicle
entered a United Power Association/Cooperative Power Association construction site.
Upon hearing gunshots, one of two UPA/CPA guards opened the door to his vehicle. As
the dome light went on, a shot pierced the windshield of the guard's vehicle, causing
fragments to strike the guard in the face and chest. A few more shots were fired before the
light-colored vehicle left the site. Id
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of a $50,000 reward for information leading to the conviction of persons
involved in the March 14 incident, Ardys Fischer came forward and
made a statement to the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
(MCBA).22 Ardys Fischer, the estranged wife of Harold Fischer, made
no secret of the fact that she wanted to collect the reward. Her state-
ments, implicating her husband, the defendant, and others as being in-
volved in the shooting incident, were made only after she was assured of
a possibility of receiving the reward.23
Based on her statements, MBCA agents interviewed her husband. The
agents promised Mr. Fischer a lesser charge accompanied with immunity
for his wife and daughter if he would make a statement regarding what
he knew of the shooting incident and who was involved. 24 During the
defendant's trial, both Ardys and Harold Fischer refused to testify.25
The state attempted to introduce both prior statements of the Fischers
into evidence under the statement against penal interest26 and residual
hearsay 27 exceptions to the exclusionary hearsay rule. The defendant ob-
jected on the ground that admission of the statements would violate his
sixth amendment right of confrontation.28 The state, in refuting the de-
fendant's claim, argued that defendant had intimidated the witnesses
and therefore, he had waived his sixth amendment right.2 9 The state
22. Id
23. See id at 102. Ms. Fischer stated that when she returned home that evening, she
found her husband, Harold Fischer, the defendant, and others talking in the Fischer
kitchen. The group in the kitchen was allegedly discussing going to the powerline con-
struction site "to mess up a crane" and "to shoot at the guard's vehicle." Id at 98.
24. Id at 98-99.
25. Id at 99. Mr. Fischer, when called as a witness, invoked his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. He was found in contempt and incarcerated. Ardys
Fischer also refused to testify and was found in contempt but summary punishment was
not imposed. Id
26. Id The state moved for admission of Harold Fischer's statements as a statement
against penal interest under MINN. R. EvID. 804(b)(3). See supra note 15. A statement
against penal interest is one which subjects the declarant to criminal liability. Such state-
ments are presumed to be trustworthy even in the absence of an oath, presence at trial and
cross-examination, where the statement tends to subject the declarant to criminal liability
that a reasonable person would not make the statement unless he believed it to be true.
See generaly C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 276 (discussion on statements against penal
interest under FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)).
27. 312 N.W.2d at 99. The state moved for admission of Ardys Fischer's statements
under the residual hearsay exception for statement of unusual trustworthiness under
MINN. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). See supra note 16.
28. The defendant also objected to the admission of the statements against the wit-
ness' penal interest, stating that the declarant must believe that the statement was against
his interest at the time he made it. The defendant cited United States v. Dovico, 380 F.2d
325, 327 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944 (1967), and United States v. Love, 592 F.2d
1022 (8th Cir. 1979), in support of the proposition that Mr. Fischer's statements did not
admit criminal conduct. See Appellant's Brief at 20.
29. 312 N.W.2d at 99.
500 [Vol. 9
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also offered evidence that corroborated the Fischers' statements. 30 Based
on these facts, the trial court agreed with the state and admitted the
statements.3 1 The jury found Hansen guilty on three counts. 32 The de-
fendant was sentenced to concurrent jail terms of two years, from which
he brought an appeal.
33
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling con-
cerning the admissibility of the unavailable declarants' statements. The
court held that the evidence was not admissible under either the state-
ment against penal interest exception or the residual hearsay exception.34
The Hansen court determined that Ms. Fischer's statement was inadmissi-
ble under the residual hearsay exception because it lacked the necessary
assurances of reliability and trustworthiness.35 The court also concluded
that Mr. Fischer's statement given after assurances of lenient treatment
"indicate[d] that his statement was not against his penal interest; rather,
as a result of the bargain, it was in his best interest to make the
statement."
36
In reaching its conclusion, the Hansen court applied the two-step ap-
proach that the United States Supreme Court advocated in Ohio v. Rob-
erts. 37 First, the evidence must be necessary, which may be shown by
30. Id at 100. Testimony by a crime lab analyst indicated that the truck tire im-
prints at the scene were consistent with those having been made by tires on Darrell Bartos'
pickup truck. Evidence that Darrell Bartos' pickup truck matched the truck's description
given by the guards was admitted. Also, in accord with the statement that defendant had
come to the Fischers' in a green coupe, state motor vehicle records were presented indicat-
ing that a green 1974 Plymouth Duster was registered to defendant's son. Further refuting
defendant's contention that he did not know any of the other alleged participants, tele-
phone records were produced showing calls made from the defendant's residence to an-
other accused. 312 N.W.2d at 100.
31. The trial court held an in-chambers hearing to determine whether the defendant
had forfeited his right to confrontation by making threats to the witnesses. Id at 99.
32. Mr. Hansen was convicted of:
(1) aggravated criminal damage to property, causing a reasonably foreseeable
risk of bodily harm in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(l) (1980);
(2) aggravated criminal damage to property, reducing the value of the property
by more than $300 in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(3) (1978);
and
(3) conspiring to commit aggravated criminal damage to property, in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 609.175, subd. 2(3) (1980), and Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd.
1(3) (1978).
See id at 100.
33. 312 N.W.2d at 100.
34. See id at 101.
35. The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that Ms. Fischer's statement was taken
some time after the incident, and was not under oath. Her testimony also was fragmented
and lacking in firsthand information. The court noted that she was separated from her
husband at the time of her testimony and her only motive for giving a statement was to
receive the reward. See id at 101-02.
36. Id at 101.
37. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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proving that the declarant is unavailable.38 Second, the declarant's
statement must be reliable. 39 In applying the Roberts two-step analysis to
the Hansen case, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that although the
Fischers were unavailable and their testimony was necessary, their testi-
mony was not sufficiently reliable to overcome the conflict between the
confrontation clause and the exceptions to the hearsay rule.4o
The problem the Hansen court faced in balancing the defendant's right
to confrontation under the sixth amendment and the state's need to in-
troduce evidence made by unavailable declarants is one that is fre-
quently before the court.4 1 In 1980, the Minnesota Supreme Court
decided two cases that also address this problem: State v. Olson 42 and State
v. Black. 43 In Olson and Black, the court established the general rule that
a defendant who causes the absence of a witness against him by threats
or intimidation waives his sixth amendment right to confront the wit-
ness.44 The Hansen court examined its facts in light of the Olson and
Black rulings and held that there was no "direct or indirect evidence
indicating that defendant's conduct had caused the Fischers' silence." 4 5
38. Id at 65. A declarant who refuses to testify based on the fifth amendment, as in
Hansen, is considered to be unavailable for the purposes of the confrontation clause. See
Phillips v. Wyrick, 558 F.2d 489, 494 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088 (1978).
39. See 448 U.S. at 65-66.
40. See 312 N.W.2d at 102-03.
41. This conflict is inherent in all cases that attempt to decide the admissibility of
inculpatory extrajudicial statements. See generally Comment, Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b) (3) and Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1189, 1215
(1978). Inculpatory statements are declarations which implicate both the declarant and
the defendant in criminal activity and which are admitted in evidence against the defend-
ant. Several courts have discussed the issue of whether the drafters intended that state-
ments against penal interest be excluded from the hearsay exceptions. See United States v.
Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1098 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. White, 553 F.2d
310, 313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977); United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490,
498-99 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1977).
42. 291 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1980). The trial court in Olson admitted two out-of-court
exparte statements made to the police by the co-conspirator who refused to testify due to
threats made by the defendant. Prior to trial the witness was killed. The state offered the
witness' testimony as a statement against penal interest. The Supreme Court held that
there was a violation of the defendant's right of confrontation and had the defendant not
forfeited this right by his own wrongdoing, the conviction would have been reversed. See
id at 206. The Olson court gave no indication of the evidentiary threshold level necessary
for a court to find that a defendant has forfeited his right to confrontation.
43. 291 N.W.2d 208 (Minn. 1980). The Black court agreed with the trial court's rul-
ing that the accused had forfeited his right to confrontation, when evidence was heard
indicating that the accused had the witness beaten up to prevent her from testifying. Id.
at 214.
44. See Black, 291 N.W.2d at 214; Olson, 291 N.W.2d at 207-08.
45. 312 N.W.2d at 104-05. The Hansen court stated that "to find a waiver based on a
witness' reluctance to testify, absent any evidence of threats attributable to defendant,
would destroy the right of confrontation in nearly all cases of alleged crimes against per-
sons." Id at 105; accord United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979).
The facts surrounding the alleged threats are as follows. Ms. Fischer and her counsel
[Vol. 9
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The Hansen court continued, "[W]e are compelled to conclude that the
trial court erred in determining that defendant had waived his constitu-
tionally guaranteed right of confrontation."4
6
Justice Yetka dissented, emphasizing the principle that the "defendant
should not be permitted to invoke the sixth amendment where he himself
is responsible for the failure of the court to have available personal testi-
mony of the Fischers."4 7 Justice Yetka was convinced that the only rea-
son that the Fischers refused to testify was because the defendant
intimidated them.48 He could find no reason to differentiate the Hansen
case from the court's earlier rulings in Olson and Black. 49
The majority opinion in Hansen stresses the importance of admitting
reliable and trustworthy statements into evidence in a criminal trial,
whereas Justice Yetka's dissent emphasizes the need to discourage de-
fendants who intimidate prospective witnesses from testifying, by finding
that the defendant will thereby waive his sixth amendment right to con-
frontation. The effect of the Hansen decision will be that a defendant's
constitutional right to confrontation will not be denied him or her with-
out direct evidence that the defendant did in fact intimidate witnesses,
who refuse to testify.
The court held that the Fischers' out-of-court statements were inad-
missible both because the statements were hearsay not within an excep-
tion to the rule, and their admission violated Hansen's sixth amendment
right to confrontation. One wonders why the court included the sixth
amendment analysis when the hearsay violation might have provided
sufficient grounds for reversal of the conviction; usually the court will
avoid a constitutional analysis unless it is necessary to the holding of the
case. Further, because the court did not specify which ground made the
admission not to be harmless error, the severity of the hearsay violation
remains unclear. If the prosecution had placed the Fischers on the wit-
ness stand, could their statements have been admitted for purposes other
than impeachment? Also, if the Fischers had made sufficiently specific
declarations to prove waiver by intimidation of Hansen's right to con-
both denied that she had received any threats from defendant. 312 N.W.2d at 104-05.
Mr. Fischer made a few vague references to "getting smoked" or killed. Id at 100. There
was no clear indication that his fear was the result of acts by or on behalf of the defendant.
Mr. Fischer spoke with Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension agents while in cus-
tody, and made some reference to "this party from Wadena." Id An agent asked whether
"that party" was the defendant. Fischer replied, "[Y]eah, that's the party I mean." Id
When Mr. Fischer was asked if he had been threatened, he only said, "I don't want to talk
about it." Id at 104.
46. 312 N.W.2d at 105.
47. Id at 106. Justice Yetka noted that "there was no lack of an opportunity for
confrontation because there is no doubt that if defendant had called the Fischers, they
would have testified." Id at 105-06.
48. Id. at 105.
49. Id at 106.
19831
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frontation, would the admission of the hearsay statements have been
harmless error? These questions remain unanswered by State v. Hansen.
Products Liability-REcoVERY OF ECONOMIC Loss IN COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS--Supewood Corp. v. Siempe/kamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159
(Minn. 1981).
The doctrine of products liability was developed primarily to compen-
sate consumers for personal injury and property damage caused by defec-
tive products.I Most importantly, the doctrine protects non-commercial
buyers who cannot adequately protect themselves against defective prod-
ucts. 2 Consumers can recover under warranty, negligence, 3 or strict lia-
bility theories4 for personal injury and property damage.5
Courts have not received claims for economic loss damages in commer-
cial transactions as readily as they have received consumer claims. A
majority of the states6 that have considered the issue follow Seell v. White
Motor Co., 7 and disallow recovery of economic loss under either negli-
1. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motor Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel Stnct Liability to the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122-
24 (1960).
2. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
3. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 1120; see also Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,
19, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965) (commercial consumer was held to have
adequate remedies under the U.C.C.).
4. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967) (the basic
theory of McCormick is embodied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
5. See Noel Transfer & Package Delivery Serv., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 341 F.
Supp. 968 (D. Minn. 1972); Peterson v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 296 Minn. 438, 209
N.W.2d 922 (1973).
6. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25, 27-
33 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Miehle Co. v. Smith-Brooks Printing Co., 303 F. Supp. 501, 503 (D.
Colo. 1969); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); Beauchamp
v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 P.2d 41 (1973); Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135
Ga. App. 293, 217 S.E.2d 602 (1975); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326,
581 P.2d 784 (1978); Marcil v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 9 Mass. App. 908, 403
N.E.2d 430 (1980); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 Ii. App. 2d 362,
219 N.E.2d 726 (1966); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d
643 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); City of La
Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assoc., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
7. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). The Seely court considered
whether a plaintiff could recover the purchase price of a defective truck and the resulting
loss of profits for lack of its normal use. The court refused to allow recovery on the theory
of strict liability, stating that the law of sales was designed to meet the needs of parties
involved in commercial transactions. To allow other forms of recovery would undermine
the law of sales, and would not reflect the intent of the parties. In dicta, the court indi-
cated that economic losses could not be recovered under a negligence theory.
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